Examinations rarely go badly because an institution lacks controls. They go badly because the institution cannot produce evidence that the controls were applied to the build that shipped, on the date in question, and that someone acted when they fired.
This is a four-week plan for closing that gap. It assumes you already have a mobile app in production and a regulator with expectations, which describes most banks, insurers, e-wallets and public agencies in the region.
Whatever your jurisdiction, the mobile application section of the rulebook asks for a similar short list. BNM’s RMiT, the MAS Technology Risk Management Guidelines, HKMA supervisory guidance and the BSP circulars all expect an app to resist tampering and reverse engineering, detect compromised device environments, avoid storing credentials on the device, be tested before release, and produce reviewable logs.
Six control families, and one requirement running underneath all of them: evidence.
Days 1 to 7
Find out what you actually have
You cannot evidence controls on apps you have not counted, and most organisations own more mobile apps than the security team is aware of.
1Inventory every app, including those owned by other business units, regional subsidiaries and marketing. Note platform, framework, release cadence and who owns the build pipeline.
2Scan each one for vulnerabilities, exposed secrets and risky third-party libraries. The SDK supply chain is the one infection route you fully control, so it belongs in the baseline.
3Decompile your own highest-risk app and look at what comes back. This is the attacker’s first step and it costs you nothing to run yourself.
4Rank by what an attacker gains, not by app popularity. A low-traffic app that moves money outranks a high-traffic app that does not.
Deliverable: a ranked app inventory and a dated scan report per app. That report is itself evidence of pre-release testing, which is one of your six control families closed in week one.
Days 8 to 14
Apply protection, prove it works, change nothing else
Take the highest-risk app only. Resist the urge to roll out across the portfolio in week two, because you will need the learning from a single app before you scale the policy.
1Apply hardening to the compiled binary. Codeless protection matters here for a practical reason: a 30-day plan cannot include a development sprint.
2Turn detection on in monitoring mode with no enforcement. You want data before you want blocking.
3Verify against a real sample in a controlled environment rather than trusting the datasheet. Modify the protected build, re-sign it, and confirm it refuses to run.
4Record the verification. A short dated note with screenshots is worth more in an examination than a vendor certificate.
Deliverable: one protected app in production and a demonstration you can repeat in front of an examiner.
Days 15 to 21
Read the telemetry before you enforce on it
This week is usually where the programme gets properly funded, because monitoring mode reveals the infection rate inside your own user base. That number is almost always higher than the organisation assumed, and it is specific to you rather than drawn from an industry report.
1Establish your baseline infection rate: the share of sessions showing malware or compromised environment indicators.
2Break detections down by type. Which techniques are being used against you specifically should drive your policy, not a generic template.
3Tune thresholds against real data and measure the false-positive rate deliberately. An unmeasured false-positive rate is what gets protection disabled six months later.
4Draft the customer messages and have support review them. A message naming what was found and what to do next turns a frightening moment into a trust-building one.
Deliverable: a severity-based response policy grounded in your own telemetry, and support scripts that already exist when enforcement starts.
Days 22 to 30
Make it survive the next release
1Switch on enforcement, highest-severity detections first. Hooking and repackaging before rooted devices.
2Add the hardening step to CI/CD so every release inherits it. This is the single most important item in the plan, because manual application is how protection silently drifts out of a build.
3Feed telemetry into your security operations centre so detections reach the people who watch for campaigns.
4Assemble the evidence pack and schedule its refresh. Then begin rolling out across the rest of the inventory.
By day 30 you should be able to hand an examiner the following without preparation.
| Control family | Evidence you can produce |
| Resistance to reverse engineering | The protection policy applied per app, plus a decompilation result showing what is and is not recoverable |
| Anti-tampering and anti-repackaging | A live demonstration: a modified build refusing to run, and the log entry it generated |
| Compromised environment detection | Detection coverage list, the configured response per condition, and evidence it works offline |
| No credentials on the device | Static analysis output for the current release, plus your key rotation record |
| Pre-release testing | Dated scan results per build from the pipeline, with remediation tracked to closure |
| Logging and retention | Retained detection logs, the retention period, and the role-based access model over them |
Five figures, tracked against your baseline every release cycle. Infection rate in your user base. Detections by type. Blocked transaction value, which is the clearest return figure available and the one that renews budget. False-positive rate. And time from a new technique appearing to protection updating, where days is achievable and weeks means weeks of exposure.
Week 1, and every build after
IronScan runs static and dynamic assessment against OWASP, CVE and CWE, covering exposed secrets, insecure storage, permission risk and weak integrity checks, including the third-party library supply chain. It runs inside CI/CD, so pre-release testing becomes a dated report per build rather than an annual exercise.
Weeks 2 and 4
IronWall applies code protection, anti-tampering, anti-repackaging and runtime detection to the compiled binary with no SDK and no source code changes, which is what makes a four-week timeline realistic. Response policy is set per threat and per app by you, and the step lives in your pipeline so it cannot drift out of a release. On-premise deployment keeps binaries inside your perimeter.
Week 3, and the evidence pack
IronSky is what makes monitoring mode useful: every detection logged the second it happens, with device conditions, attack source tracing and the action taken, across the whole portfolio and exportable for audit.
Thirty days is enough to move from having controls to being able to prove them, provided the work is sequenced so that nothing depends on a development sprint. Inventory, harden one app, learn from your own telemetry, then enforce and automate.
Institutions that finish the fourth week properly stop preparing for examinations altogether, because the evidence is generated as a by-product of shipping.
Tell us your examination date and we will map your current release against the six control families, then show you what the evidence pack looks like when it is produced automatically.